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Rungrojtanakul: Sui Generis Databases

ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION
FOR SUI GENERIS DATABASES

CHANA RUNGROJTANAKUL·

I.

INTRODUCTION

The economic justification for sui generis databases needs to be reexamined. Unrestricted import and export of goods and services between nations is part of an ideal international trade policy that is subject to the
fundamental economic theories of "Demand-Supply" and "Maximization" (comparative advantage). Against the prevailing wisdom that freeflowing commerce would threaten domestic producers, 18th century political economist and philosopher Adam Smith believed that, based upon
comparative advantage theory, nations should export what they can produce most efficiently and inexpensively and import "what it will cost
them more to make than to buy."l In opposition to the concept of free
* LL.B. Chu1a10ngkorn University, 1992; LL.M. (Taxation), 1994; LL.M. (International
Legal Studies), 1995: SJ.D. (International Legal Studies), Golden Gate University, 2005.
I.
4 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS § 2, at 12 (1776) ("If a foreign country can
supply us with a commodity cheaper than we ourselves can make it, better buy it of them with some
part of the produce of our own industry, employed in a way in which we have some advantage.").
See also, Steven Suranovic, The Theory of Comparative Advantage - Overview (last visited Sept. 20,
2005) <http://internationalecon.comlv 1.0/ch40/40cOOO.htm1>.
The theory of comparative advantage is perhaps the most important concept in international trade theory. It is also one of the most commonly misunderstood principles. There
is a popular story told amongst economists that once when an economics skeptic asked
Paul Samuelson (a Nobel laureate in economics) to provide a meaningful and non-trivial
result from the economics discipline, Samuelson quickly responded with, "comparative
advantage." The sources of the misunderstandings are easy to identifY. First, the principle of comparative advantage is clearly counter-intuitive. Many results from the formal
model are contrary to simple logic. Secondly, the theory is easy to confuse with another
notion about advantageous trade, known in trade theory as the theory of absolute advantage. The logic behind absolute advantage is quite intuitive. This confusion between
these two concepts leads many people to think that they understand comparative advantage when in fact, what they understand, is absolute advantage. Finally, the theory of
141
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trade, protectionism continues to be promoted in the interest of defending
domestic industries from foreign competition.
The European invention of the sui generis system promotes unfair competition. Under the European Database Directive's regime, the economic
interest of the European database makers has been satisfied as the protection of factual and data content is granted to them. 2 Not only the duration of protection that creates an unlimited term of protection, but also
the requirement of reciprocal treatment combine to create a monopoly for
the European database industries, 3 promoting the interest of defending its
local industries from foreign competition. Such a protectionist regime
produces a number of negative effects, among which are restricting "free
competition" and turning one particular region's free trade into another
country's economic exploitation; this is especially true in developing
countries with fragile economies and limited resources. The system of
the free flow of trade, which is championed by Adam Smith's theory of
the "invisible hand," the self-interested actions of both consumers and
producers to promote an optimal economic and social outcome, should
be maintained. 4 Regulating the sui generis right is an irresponsible action of the European Union, an attempt to steal knowledge wealth from
other countries.

comparative advantage is all too often presented only in its mathematical form. Using
numerical examples or diagrammatic representations are extremely useful in demonstrating the basic results and the deeper implications of the theory. However, it is also easy to
see the results mathematically, without ever understanding the basic intuition of the theory.
2.
The Legal Protection of Databases, WIPO Doc. SCCR/8/8, at 3 (Nov. 4, 2002) (submission by the European Community to the Standing Committee on Copyrights and Related Rights).
The sui generis protection of databases has proven to fulfill the economic expectations.
Since the entry into force of the Database Directive, the European CD-ROM and online
markets have grown at enormous rates. A large number of new database products have
been made available in Europe, many of which have been produced by small and medium-sized enterprises.
3. Council Directive 96/9/EC, arts. 10(3),11(3), 1996 OJ. (L 77) 20 [hereinafter Database
Directive].
4.
CHRIS ROHMANN, A WORLD OF IDEAS; A DICTIONARY OF IMPORTANT THEORIES,
CONCEPTS, BELIEFS AND THINKERS 247 (1999).

In a free market, prices, quantities, and production methods are governed by the forces of
Supply and Demand. When the price of a good is stable because the supply of it matches
the demand for it, the market for that good is said to be in equilibrium. The invisible
hand is not infallible, however; unemployment, inflation, and the adverse unintended
consequences of economic activity (know to economists as "negative externalities") are
examples of market failure. In these situations, government often steps in, creating subsidies, regulations, public-sector industries, taxes, and other mechanisms to correct or
avoid the malfunction. Government intervention in free market economies also typically
includes antitrust laws, tax incentives to encourage certain kinds of investment, and interest-rate manipulation.
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This article explores important economic mechanisms and competition
law that have been used to promote the competitiveness of the database
industries. Section II explains fundamental economic theories that lead
to an understanding of the concept of an efficient and perfect competition
within the database industries. Section III analyzes judicial decisions of
the two economic parties, the European Union and the United States of
America, that apply competition law to create a fair reproduction and
dissemination of factual contents and to prevent unfair competition derived from an attempt to dominate the free flow of contents in the market. Section IV examines a concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction that
the courts in the E.U. and the U.S. have utilized to assert extraterritorial
jurisdiction over activities that are constituted outside their borders. Section V addresses the concept of economic invisible hands and the competition laws that are sufficient to promote market efficiency and a competitive advantage for the worldwide database industry.
II.

RELATION OF FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC MECHANISM,
COMPETITION, AND THE PROTECTION OF SUI GENERIS
DATABASES

Whatever its choice of economic systems and national policies, a government adopts basic economic principles to promote the competitiveness of its markets, and uses legal measures to support market activities. 5
Generally, there are two fundamental economic theories that the government takes in consideration. One is "Demand-Supply," which explains the concept of price motivation between producers and consumers
in the market and the other is "Profit Maximization," which explains the
competition between players based on the concept of price motivation.
A.

DEMAND-SUPPLY

Together, Demand and Supply motivate market activities. The theory of
Demand-Supply is based on the relationship between suppliers and consumers in the market. "Supply" (ceteris paribus) is an ability and willingness to sell specific quantities of goods at alternative prices in a given
time period. 6 "Demand" (ceteris paribus), in contrast, is an ability and
willingness to buy specific quantities of goods at alternative prices in a
given time period. 7 Both Demand and Supply magnify each other, ren5.
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 2 (1962). "Government is necessary to
preserve freedom, ... Its major function must be to protect our freedom both from the enemies outside our gates and from our fellow citizens: to preserve law and order, to enforce private contracts, to
foster competitive markets."
6.
BRAD R. SCHILLER, THE ECONOMY TODAY (8th ed., 2000).
7. [d.
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dering market behavior. If there is high demand by consumers for a specific product in the market, the increase in demand will cause the price of
the product to be increased as well. Once the demand is greater than the
supply, prices will rise and that price motivation may tempt new suppliers to produce that specific product and move into a market already
dominated by a few suppliers. In contrast, if suppliers over-produce a
specific product, the supply becomes greater than the demand. Then
prices will drop and become more competitive and consumers will benefit from the competition between the suppliers offering that product.
B.

PROFIT MAxIMIZATION AND MAXIMIZING BEHAVIOR

Profit Maximization explains the natural market behavior that leads to
competition. In a perfect market environment, the Profit Maximization is
the most profitable rate of output which is indicated by the intersection of
marginal revenue and marginal cost or where marginal revenue equals
marginal cost. 8 This means a firm maximizes profit when it could sell a
single item of a specific product and gain the profit at the cost of producing it. Consequently, the maximized profit, which becomes profit incentive, stimulates competition in the market. Any firm would want to enter
into a market that has already been dominated by the original player.
The economists describe this kind of behavior as a "Maximizing Behavior."9
Maximizing Behavior applies to all market participants. Consumers
come with a limited amount of income to spend.1O They wish to buy the
most desirable goods and services that their limited budgets will permit.
However, they cannot afford everything they want, so they must make
choices about how to spend their scarce dollars. Their goal is to maximize the utility (satisfaction) they get from their available incomes.
Businesses come to the marketplace with a quest to maximize profits. 11
They try to use resources efficiently and lower the cost of production, or
even to have legal protections reduced or increased in order to maximize
the profit. The public sector also has a maximizing goal called "welfare
maximization." 12 Government has to use available resources to serve
and maximize the public need. Thus, the resources available for this
purpose are finite. Hence local, state, and federal governments must use
scarce resources carefully, striving to maximize the general welfare of
society.
8.
9.
10.
11.

!d. at 462.
[d.
[d.

12.

[d.

[d.
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AN ApPLICATION OF ECONOMIC THEORIES TO SUI GENERIS
DATABASES

The above-mentioned economic theories can be directly applied to market activities of the database industries. In a perfect market environment,
the theories of Demand-Supply and Maximizing Behavior act together to
explain market behavior in relation to price mechanism. If the prices of
database goods and services are not too high, the demand of consumers
will increase. The increasing demand, consequently, motivates the database compilers or makers to produce more products or services to supply
the market. Price mechanism will motivate subsequent compilers to enter into the market that already has been captured by the original players.
This is because the subsequent database makers foresee how they can
maximize profit at the cost of producing one additional unit. Some database makers even enter further into their "market opportunity" by developing better and cheaper databases to supply the market. In this sense,
the competition flourishes. Vice versa, if the prices increase, the demand
of consumers will drop. The consumers will opt out for a product offering with an alternative price.
Every relationship in the market is determined by the price mechanism.
The databases, ranging from hard products (CD-ROM or compilations)
to soft products (online database services), will be consumed if the costs
are not too high for the consumer to afford. At this point, the market
price of databases will not rise above or equal the marginal price. This is
because no firm may charge more than another; any attempt by a single
firm to raise a price would result in a loss of sales as buyers opt for a
lower priced product. On the other hand, if the market price drops below
a producer's marginal cost, the producer will not gain enough revenue
from the sale of a unit to cover his expenses in producing an item. Consequently, he will ultimately be forced to drop out of the competition in
the market.
Any subsequent database maker will be tempted to enter into the market
that is already dominated by the original databases makers if there is an
equal market opportunity. They may use different business strategies to
attract consumers, including product improvement and development.
However, competition would flourish only if the underlying data is free
to the subsequent compilers so they are not forced to start from scratch
by doing a survey and rediscovering the same data. Legal measures, if
any, should be provided to subsidize competition, but not to eliminate the
subsequent compilers from the market or to allow the original database
makers to dictate supply and price.
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According to D' Amato and Long, copyright protection constitutes a temporary monopoly over reproduction and dissemination of expressive contents. \3 They explained that an author of creative works generally obtains exclusive rights which would create a temporary monopoly by way
of a lengthy duration of protection, the author's life plus fifty years. 14
Through a licensing scheme, the consumers pay more than they should
for licensing products. 15 The subsequent compilers will be reluctant to
incur the costs by starting from scratch and entering a market or absorbing monopolistic prices of copyrighted items. 16 Although they did not
mention any applicable economic theory in connection with the factual
contents, they appear to support the idea that copyright law maintains a
proper balance, providing an incentive to the authors and promoting the
public free flow of access to information, by stating: "The limit is important because the purpose of copyright is not solely to reward authors, but
rather to induce production at the minimum possible cost to society. The
law, by limiting the ownership of data, thus, favors its free movement
and therefore contributes to the general progress of society."17 They
emphasized that a government's granting of protection of any kind
should neither limit the public access to information nor avail any private
entity an absolute monopoly window in information goods and services.

13.
ANTHONY D'AMATO & DORIS ESTELLE LONG, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ANTHOLOGY; UNDERLYING THEORIES 54 (1996).
In a desire to reward the author, and hence encourage production of new works, copyright
essentially grants the author a monopoly over the reproduction and dissemination of his
creative expression for a limited period of time. Thus, copyright is also a tax to society,
because the author may set the price he chooses for the work, though the work faces potential substitution if the price is too high and buyers opt instead for other, similar
works."
See also, SCHILLER, supra note 6, at 496.
A "monopoly" situation is when a firm produces the entire market supplies of a particular
good and service ... Although monopolies simplify the geometry, they complicate the
arithmetic of profit maximization. In theory, this special adaptation of the profitmaximizing rule does not work for a monopolist. The demand curve facing a monopolist
is downward-sloping. Because of this, marginal revenue is not equal to price for a monopolist. On the contrary, marginal revenue is always less than price in a monopoly,
which makes it just a bit more difficult to find the profit-maximizing rate of output.
14.
D'AMATO & loNG, supra note 13, at 54. "In order to protect the copyright holder while
mitigating the burden of his monopoly on his competitors and customers, the protection is limited to
creative expression for a specific period of time."
15.
Id. "Competition is prohibited from copying expressions without the author's consent. To
produce new works, competitors must pay to license, or they must start from scratch."
16. Id.
17. Id. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEx. L. REv. 989, 1014 (1997).
Copyright protection does not extend to the ideas, facts, or functional elements of a work,
but only to the author's original expression of those ideas or elements. Thus, a copyright
owner in a database of facts cannot prevent a user from copying the facts themselves
from the database. Only the creative effort (if any) that has gone into the selection or organization of material is entitled to protection.
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In contrast, the European Union's creation of sui generis protection, constitutes a monopoly by means of its perpetual duration of protection. In
reference to the Database Directive, it specifies two-tiered protection,
one attached to the creative selection and arrangement of the content of
databases and the other to the factual or data content. 18 The sui generis
system provides the database makers an ownership right to prevent the
unauthorized extraction and/or reutilization of both creative and factual
contents of databases for commercial purposes and unlimited duration of
protection if the database makers show that there is substantial change in
the databases. 19 This is convincing evidence that the regime of sui
generis databases is not unjustifiable per se.
D.

JUSTIFIABLE ECONOMIC CONCEPT OF COMPETITION

Competition, in an economic context, can be referred to as the actions of
two or more rivals in pursuit of the same objective. 20 In the context of
markets, the specific objective is either selling goods to buyers or alternatively buying goods from sellers. 21 In a system of perfect competition,
there would be a number of sellers, a number of buyers, and perfect market information available to all. 22 The sellers, competing among themselves for business, would be induced to make and provide what their
customers want. To do so they would aspire to be inventive and progressive and to minimize costs. The pressures of competition would keep
prices near costs.
However, the process of competition may result in one firm dominating
the market. Competition between firms may produce a "winner" which
dominates the market, or a "national" monopoly may exist on the market. 23 A firm with sustained monopoly power would have an incentive to
18.
19.

Database Directive, supra note 3, arts. 3 & 7.
[d. art. 10(3).

20.
AREEDA KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 5 (5th ed., 1997).
21.
[d.
22.
[d. at 6.
A market economy will be perfectly competitive if the following conditions hold:
(I) Sellers and buyers are so numerous that no one's action can have a perception impact on the market price, and there is no collusion among buyers
and sellers.
(2) Consumers register their subjective preferences among various goods
and services through market transactions at fully known market prices.
(3) All relevant prices are known to each producer, who also knows of all
input combinations technically capable of producing any specific combination
of outputs and who makes input-output decisions solely to maximize profits.
(4) Every producer has equal access to all input markets and there are no artificial barriers to the production of any product.
23.
ROHMANN, supra note 4, at 71. "The economic theory of competition spans a continuum,
from perfect competition, in which many sellers offer the same product under the same circumstances, to monopoly, in which a product is available from only one source, which therefore has no
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act inefficiently, which could involve letting costs rise; to use their power
to exploit consumers; and to strike down competitors to preserve its monopoly in the market. Such activities constitute an economic inefficiency
in the market and restrain competition. In these situations, it may be
necessary for a governmental body to take certain measures to restrain
the dominating firms' behavior.
Competition law, therefore, exists to protect the process of competition
in a free market economy.24 Competition law embodies legal measures
that the government adopts in accordance with the form of economic
organization which brings the greatest benefits to society. 25 To foster
diversity and pluralism, competition law seeks to promote effective and
undistorted competition in the market. The basis of free competition
between firms is believed to deliver efficiency, low prices, and innovation. Competition and competition law that serves the market economy
tend to keep markets free and open, thereby providing opportunities for
entrepreneurs and their small- and medium-sized enterprises. 26
In perfect competition, the welfare of consumers should be maximized.
Under this perfect competitive environment, the consumers determine
the amount of economic resources available, which maximizes the efficiency of the market. The cost of the production of goods and services
will be as low as possible because the undertakings need to remain competitive. The prices remain low as a function of the mechanics of supply
and demand.

competition. Both of these model circumstances are rare; more common are atomistic and monopolistic competition and oligopoly."
24.
ELEANOR M. Fox, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION 801 (2002).
Many analysts assume that a system of free enterprise with competition law exists only to
obtain a more efficient allocation of resources or only to prevent price rises to consumers
and that competition law has exactly and only this goal. Of course, as we have seen, that
is not the case. Competition law usually has other goals as well. In the European Union,
these goals include market integration, openness, control of dominance, fairness, and
competitiveness (the growth of efficient, dynamic and responsive fInns for the sake of the
European economic strength in world markets).
ALISON JONES AND BRENDA SUFRIN, EC COMPETITION LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
25.
MATERIALS 3 (200 I).
26.
Andres Guadamuz Gonzales, The Impact oj Globalization on Competition Law 6-7 (2002)
at <http://www .democraciadigital.orgletc/arts/020 I global.html>.
It would appear that the rationale behind competition law is very complex. It exists to
protect the consumer, it also protects smaller enterprises from preying practices of powerful undertakings, it protects the economy, and it is also benefIcial for the "common good"
of society. Whatever reason, it can be argued that the goal of competition policy is to fInd
a balance with a market which no undertaking is allowed to become too dominant.
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APPLICABILITY OF COMPETITION LAW TO PROMOTE
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF SUI GENERISDATABASES

Inasmuch as perfect competition is an ideal set forth by a theory, reality
is often different. The reality is that monopolies do occur. Whereas the
WIPO Draft Database Treaty, like other intellectual property laws, tends
to create a monopoly window for the database makers, giving them an
ability to control prices and production, competition law, in a given society in Europe or in the United States, tends to promote market efficiency
and competition in the databases industries. There is existing evidence
of how the courts in the E.U. and the U.S. apply competition law to support competition in the database industries.
A.

THE POSITION OF E.U. COMPETITION LAW

Member States of the European Union have utilized competition law to
enhance economic efficiency and social development in their common
internal market. Every year the Competition Directorate publishes a
report 27 that reexamines the objectives of Community competition policy
to be in compliance with Articles 81 (ex 85) and 82(ex 86) of the Treaty
Establishing the European Community of 1957 (E.C. Treaty).28 In short,
Article 81 (1) declares that agreements that distort competition are incompatible with the common market;29 Article 81(2) declares such

27.
FOx, supra note 24, 784-787. Referring to the XXXth Report on Competition Policy
(2000), '\II states:
Competition Policy is one of the pillars of the European Commission's action in the economic field. This action is founded on the principle, enshrined in the Treaty, of "an open
market economy with free competition." It acknowledges the fundamental role of the
market and of competition in guaranteeing consumer welfare, in encouraging the optimum allocation of resources and in granting economic agents the appropriate incentives
to pursue productive efficiency, quality, and innovation.
See also, TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY [hereinafter EC Treaty] arts. 81-82
(as amended); the XXIXth Report on Competition Policy (1999) '\I 2 states: "The First objective of
competition policy is the maintenance of competitive markets. Competition policy serves as an
instrument to encourage industrial efficiency, the optimal allocation of resources, technical progress
and the flexibility to adjust to a changing environment;" and the XXVIth Report on Competition
Policy (1996), '\12 states:
Competition policy is both a Commission policy in its own right and an integral part of a
large number of European Union policies and with them seeks to achieve the Community
objectives set out in Article 2 of the Treaty, including the promotion of harmonization
and balanced development of economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary
growth which respects the environment, a high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion.
28.
EC TREATY, Nov. 10, 1997, OJ. (C 340) 3 (1997).
29.
Id. art. 81(1).
The Following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions, by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object
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agreements void;30 and Article 81(3) allows exemption for such agreements or practices that are economically progressive and benefit consumers.31 Article 82 prohibits abuse of a dominant position. 32 In addition, the European Parliament and its Commission are bound to promote
balance and sustain economic and social progress in the Community and
in other areas as well: merger control,33 liberalization and state intervention,34 and state aid. 35
In Radio Telejis Eireann v. Commission (Magill),36 the European Court
of Justice (ECJ) held that a refusal to license copyright in factual conor effect the prevention, restriction or distribution of competition within the common
market, and in particular those which:
(a) direct or indirect fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
30.
Id. art. 81 (2). "Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void."
31.
Id. art. 81 (3).
The provisions of paragraph I may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decision by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting
benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
32. Id. art. 82.
Any abuse one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market
in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse, in particular, consist
in:
(a) direct or indirect imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice
of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to
commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
33.
Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings.
34.
EC TREATY arts. 37 & 90.
35.
Id. arts. 90, 92-94.
36.
Case C-241-24J/91 P, RTE & ITP v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, [1995] 6 C.M.L.R.
718 (1995).
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tents infringed Article 82 of the E.C. Treaty. The ECJ upheld the Commission's decision in Magill TV Guide v. Independent Television Publications Ltd. (lTP), British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC) and Radio
Telefis Eireann Authority (RTE).37 The Commission of the European
Communities (Commission) held that the policies and practices ofITP,
BBC and RTE, respectively, in relation to their individual advance
weekly program listings, constituted infringements of Article 82.38 Each
broadcasting organization published weekly listings of its programs in
Ireland and North Ireland, gave newspapers its schedule free on a daily
basis (according to strictly enforced licensing conditions),39 and claimed
copyright protection over its program listings. Therefore, RTE had statutory monopoly over television broadcasting in Ireland,40 whereas BBC
and ITP had a statutory duopoly in the U.K. (including Northern Ireland).41 At that time, no composite TV guide existed. An Irish publisher, Magill, started to publish a comprehensive weekly TV guide giving details of all programs available to viewers in Ireland and Northern
Ireland. It sought licenses from RTE, BBC and ITP but the licenses were
denied. 42 Magill complained to the Commission that the television companies, by refusing to give out reliable advance listings information and
protecting their listing by enforcing their copyright, were infringing Article 82.
In the finding, the relevant product market 43 was identified in view of the
potential demand for weekly TV guides. The products to be taken into
account were the advance weekly listings of ITP and BBC regional program services and those of R TE and also the TV guides in which these

37.
Commission Decision 8912051EEC, relating to a proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC
Treaty (IV/31.85 1- Magill TV Guide/ITP, BBe and RTE), 1988 OJ. (L 78) 43; [1989]4 C.M.L.R.
755 (1989).
38. Id. art. I.
39. Id. ~ 15.
40. Id. ~ 2.
41. Id. ~~ 3-4.
42. Id. ~ 5.
43.
Commission Notice on the Defmition of the Relevant Market, 1997 O.J. C 372/5 II.
A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products'
characteristics, their prices and their intended use... The relevant geographic market
comprises the area in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and
demand of products or services, in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently
homogeneous and which can be distinguished from neighboring areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those areas... The relevant market
within which to assess a given competition issue is therefore established by the combination of the product and geographic markets. The Commission interprets the definitions at
paragraph 7 and 8 (which reflects the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and the Court
of First Instance as well as its own decisional practice) according to the orientations defmed in this Notice.
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listings were published. 44 For a publisher wishing to produce a weekly
TV guide for the geographic area, these listings constituted the essential
raw materials for any such guide. 45 The individual listings were not interchangeable with one another but instead were complementary to one
another, as they concerned different programs. 46 Accordingly, the consumers experienced this difficulty and demanded that this information be
contained in a single periodical, that is, a comprehensive guide. 47
On the other hand, the relevant geographic market was determined by the
common characteristic of where the weekly listings could be received
and where TV guides containing these listings were distributed. 48 The
RTE program service was received in most, if not all, of Ireland and
Northern Ireland. 49 The BBC and ITP program services, or at least regional versions of these services, were also received in this area. 50 Any
comprehensive weekly TV guide, therefore, would contain at least the
weekly listings for these regional services. Consequently, the relevant
geographic market was most of Ireland and Northern Ireland, which constituted a substantial part of the common market for the purpose of Article 82.
The Commission provided an analysis of the existence of dominant position. First, the existence of a dominant position was found in accordance
with the nature of subject matter in this case. 51 The broadcasting organizations' listings were entitled to national copyright protection of the
United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland, which was contrary to the concept of copyright protection elsewhere in the Community. 52 This case
appeared to be a battle between intellectual property rights and competition law. Insofar as the dominant position is concerned, it is to be remembered at the outset that mere ownership of an intellectual property
right cannot confer a monopoly position. 53 Since the broadcasting organizations legitimately obtained copyright protection on their listings,
they had a monopoly over their reproduction and distribution. 54 Any
third parties who wished to produce reliable listings for publication in
their own TV guide must obtain licenses from the broadcasting organiza44.
45.

46.

1988 OJ. (L 78) 43, supra note 37, ~ 20.
Id.
Id

47.

/d.

48.
49.

Id.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

50.
51.

52.
53.
54.

~

21.

~~

8-9.

~23.
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tions, resulting in the ability of the license-holding organizations to control competition from third parties in the markets. 55 The broadcasting
organizations, thus, were in a position to prevent effective competition in
the market of weekly television magazines and, therefore, occupied a
dominant position.
Second, the existence of abuse of Article 82 was found in relation to the
broadcasting organizations' actual policies and practices. 56 ITP, BBC,
and RTE had policies to supply publishers with their advance weekly
listings but to limit, by means of the terms of licenses granted, the reproduction of these listings to one or, at most, two days' listings at a time.
Another option was to refuse to license altogether. 57 The Commission
took a view that these policies and practices were unduly restrictive to
the competition by preventing the appearance of a new product for which
there was a potential consumer demand. 58 Instead, their conduct reserved the secondary market of weekly TV guides to themselves by excluding competition through the denial of access to the basic information
that was the indispensable raw material for the compilation of such
guides. 59 In addition, the Commission asserted that such abuse also had
effect on trade between Member States because a comprehensive TV
guide containing the advance weekly listings of ITP, BBC and RTE
would clearly be marketed in both Ireland and Northern Ireland, which
would include cross-border trade in such guides. 6O In conclusion, the
Commission considered that the practices and policies of broadcasting
organizations were prohibited under Article 82 because, in fact, they
used copyright as an instrument of abuse, and in a manner that fell outside the scope of the specific subject-matter of that intellectual property
right, and by acting in a dominant position to prevent the introduction of
a new product, the weekly TV guide, to the market. 61 The Commission's
decision was also upheld by the Court of First InstanceY
Only RTE and ITP appealed to the ECJY The ECJ confmned the finding of abuse but its judgment was strikingly narrow. 64 It concentrated on
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jd.
60.
Id. ~ 24.
61.
Id. art. I.
62.
Case T-69/70/89, 76/89, RTE, ITP, SSC v. Commission 1991 E.C.R. 11-485, [1991] 4
C.M.L.R. 586 (Ct. First Instance 1991).
63.
Case C-241-241191 P, RTE & ITP v. Commission, 1995 E.C.R. 1-743, [1995)6 C.M.L.R.
718 (1995).
64.
Id. ~~ 46-58.
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the specific scenario in issue and eschewed extended discussion about
the nature of intellectual property rights and their relationship to the rules
of competition. 6S The ECJ stated:
The appellants-who were, by force of circumstances, the only
sources of the basic information on programme scheduling
which is the indispensable raw material for compiling a weekly
television guide-gave viewers wishing to obtain information on
the choice of programmes for the week ahead "no choice" but to
buy the weekly guides for each station and draw from each of
them the information they needed to make comparisons. 66
In conclusion, the ECJ held that the refusal to supply information that
was the raw material necessary for the weekly TV listings constituted an
abuse under Article 82(b) of the E.C. Treaty by means of preventing the
appearance of a new product that the appellants did not offer but for
which there was a potential consumer demand. 67
The Commission had been concerned that dominant undertakings should
not hinder competition from producing products and services. The decision in the Magill case had proved that a refusal to license intellectual
property rights under Article 82 of the E.c. Treaty would affect the competition of the database industry. Pursuant to the Database Directive,
recital 47 mentioned:
Whereas, in the interests of competition between suppliers of information products and services, protection by the sui generis
right must not be afforded in such a way as to facilitate abuses of
a dominant position, in particular as regards the creation and distribution of new products and services which have an intellectual, documentary, technical, economic or commercial added
value; whereas, therefore, the provisions of this Directive are
without prejudice to the application of Community or national
competition rules. 68
It raises an important question of how far the sui generis right under the
Database Directive regime could promote free competition. Inasmuch as
it constitutes a property right in the factual contents, the concept of protection directly opposes the copyright rationale of the public free flow of
65.
66.

67.
68.

~

46.
53.
~ 54.
Database Directive, supra note 3, at Recital 47.

[d.
[d.
[d.

~
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to information. Moreover, it violates international treaties to
which Member States are parties, especially the Berne Convention and
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 69 The action of institutions applying and enforcing the Community law must respect the general principles of law, in particular, the
principles of proportionality, legitimate expectations, and fundamental
rights. 70 To this point, it is important that when administering Community law, the Commission must ensure that such law is in compliance
with the principles of human rights, rules of natural justice, and "international comity" (living peacefully with other nations in mutual respect and
accommodating their interests, the rules of politeness, convenience, and
goodwill observed by States in their mutual intercourse without being
legally bound by them). 71
THE POSITION OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAW

B.

The first country in which antirust law took a firm legislative foothold
was the United States. Since 1890, the U.S. courts have applied the
Sherman Act to prohibit the existence of monopolies, conspiracies between companies, and lowering prices to eliminate smaller competitors. 72
Insofar as it concerned a healthy U.S. economy, the Sherman Act was
very effective in creating a system of punishment by providing private
individuals a way to recover "treble damages" for breaches of the antitrust law. 73 In regard to the compilations of facts and information, the
U.S. courts applied the doctrine of "misappropriation" to promote competition of the database industry in addition to the doctrine of "sweat of
the brow."
69.
JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 25, at 66-67.
The ECJ has developed and introduced a body of unwritten law, the general principles of
law, as part of Community law. These are rules, based on national laws of Member States
and international treaties, especially the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in accordance with which Community law is interpreted. The principles are important when determining the boundaries of proper and lawful action of the
Community and national institutions (when the latter are acting within the sphere of
Community law).

70.
7I.

Id.
Id.

72.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
Id.; see also, KAPLOW, supra note 20, at 106-107.

73.

Although antitrust laws are of general application, covering all industries and virtually all
economic activity, several "exemptions" have arisen over the years. We use the quoted
term loosely to cover quite different limitations on the reach of the antitrust laws. There
are literal exemptions by which statutes expressly allow certain conduct-for example,
by agriculture cooperatives or by labor unions-that would otherwise violate the antitrust
laws ... In addition, the courts have assumed that Congress meant to respect principles of
federalism by leaving "state action" outside the antitrust regime. Finally, the federal antitrust laws apply only where interstate and foreign commerce are involved, although applying U.S. law to foreign activity creates special difficulty.
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In International News Service V. Associated Press (INS V. AP),74 the
U.S. Supreme Court applied the doctrine of misappropriation to compilations of facts or data in news. According to the underlying fact, during
the First World War, the INS and AP were competitors engaging in the
same business conduct, news services. 7s Both gathered and published
news about wars from abroad secured from foreign governments. 76
However, AP was barred from sources in some countries and began to
pirate its competitor's news from INS's bulletin boards. 77 INS filed the
suit, alleging that AP had misappropriated its news and sought for an
injunction against its rival agency. The District Court granted the summary judgment in favor of AP and withheld the injunction. 78 On appeal,
the Appellate Court reversed the decision, issued the injunction, and restrained AP from taking or gainfully using any of INS's news by means
of the commercial value attached to the news. 79 The Supreme Court affirmed the reasoning that INS still had commercial interest in the news it
gathered.
Applying the doctrine of misappropriation, Justice Pitney delivered the
leading opinion directed to the owner's commercial or economic interest
in the commercial data or information. The Court pointed out that gathered information about events of public interest was not "susceptible of
ownership or dominion in the absolute sense."80 The gatherers had no
right against the public at large and could not generally prohibit use of
the information because news was "common property."81 Nevertheless,
the gatherers could obtain a right to restrain use of such news if there was
a commercial rival between the complainant and the defendant. In this
sense, the news must be regarded as "quasi-property"82 that had all attributes necessary to determine a misappropriation. INS, then, could prohibit its competitors from using it "until its commercial value as news
has passed away."83 The Court found that AP's conduct was an endeavor
to reap where it had not sown and amounted to an unauthorized interference to INS's legitimate business at the point where its profit was to be

74.
(1918).
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

83.

International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 63 1. Ed. 211, 39 S. Ct. 68
[d. at 217.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.at218.
[d. at 236.
[d. at 235.
Jd. at 236.
[d. at 240.
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reaped.84 AP should be prohibited from taking news from the INS bulletin board. Otherwise, no news service could stay in business.
The Court laid down elements central to INS's claim as follows: (1) the
plaintiff generated or collected information at some cost or expense;85 (2)
the value of information was highly time-sensitive;86 (3) defendant's use
of information constituted free-riding on the plaintiff's costly efforts to
generate or collect it;87 (4) the defendant's use of information was in
direct competition with a product or service offered by the plaintiff;88 and
(5) the ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff
would so reduce the incentive to produce the product or service that its
existence or quality would be substantially threatened. 89 AP's conduct
would render INS's publication profitless or of so little profit as to in
effect cut off the service by rendering the cost prohibitive in comparison
with the return.
Further, the Court reasoned that INS v. AP was about the protection of
property rights in time-sensitive information so that the information
could be made available to the public by profit-seeking entrepreneurs. If
services like INS were not assured of property rights in the news they
pay to collect, they would cease to collect it. The ability of competitors
to appropriate their product at only nominal cost and thereby to disseminate a competing product at a lower price would destroy the incentive to
collect news in the first place.
It appeared that the Court recognized a property right in such facts and
information. However, the Court did not mention that the gathered news
was copyrightable, it only referred to the gathered facts and information
as "quasi property." Though the news was realized as "common property" belonging to the public, the Court applied the doctrine of misappropriation, reasoning that the gatherer still had a commercial interest in
the contents and prevented INS from getting a free ride. The Court's
decision responded to the economic significance and interest of the gatherer in gathered facts and information.

In recent developments, the U.S. court appears to be more sophisticated
and provides a more satisfactory analysis of the doctrine of misappropriation in relation to databases. In National Basketball Association v.
84.
85.
86.

87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
/d.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 231.
at 239-240.
at 240.
at 241.
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Motorola, Inc. (NBA v. Motorola),9O the Second Circuit held that Motorola did not free-ride on NBA's product since it expended its own resources to collect purely factual information. Motorola manufactured and
marketed the SportsTrax paging device while Sports Team Analysis and
Tracking Systems (ST ATS) supplied the game information that was
transmitted to the pagers, such as the teams that were playing, score
changes, and the time remaining in the quarter. 91 NBA filed in the
Southern District of New York on the grounds of misappropriation and
sought an injunction to bar the sale of a handheld pager that displayed
updated scores and statistical information of National Basketball Association games.92 The District Court found that Motorola and STATS
were liable for misappropriation. 93 The Second Circuit reversed the deCISIOn.

In its finding, the Second Circuit outlined elements of the doctrine of
misappropriation as follows: (1) the subject matter must result from
plaintiff's own contribution, expenses, and labor in generating or collecting information; (2) the information was time sensitive; (3) the defendant's use of the information must constitute free-riding status; (4) the
defendant's use of the information was in competition with a product or
service offered by the plaintiff or likely to be offered by the plaintiff; and
(5) the ability of other parties to free ride on the efforts of the plaintiff
would so reduce the incentive to produce the product or service that the
existence or equality of the product would be substantially threatened. 94
The Second Circuit found that Motorola had not engage in unlawful misappropriation because the information transmitted to SportsTrax was not
precisely contemporaneous, but was, in fact, time sensitive. 95 Besides,
the NBA failed to show any competitive effect from SportsTrax on the
following grounds: first, the product was generating the information by
playing the games; second, the product was transmitting live, full descriptions of those games; and third, the product was collecting and retransmitting strictly factual information about the games. 96 The Court
also found that the NBA' s primary product-producing basketball games
with live attendance and licensing copyrighted broadcasts of those
games-was not infringed upon nor did it involve a free-ride, inasmuch
as Motorola markets SportsTrax as being designed for those times when
a person could not be at the arena, watch the game on TV, or listen to it
90.
91.
92.
93.

94.
95.
96.

National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F. 3d 841 (2nd Cir. 1997).
Id at 844.
Id
Id
Id at 845.
Id at 853.
Id at 854.
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on the radio. 97 In addition, the Court asserted that the transmitted contents of live events such as baseball games were not copyrightable and,
therefore, survived the Copyright Act's preemptive effect. 98 U.S. law
extends copyright protection only to an author's creative expressions, not
to facts or information.
Evidently, U.S. courts extend antitrust law to constitute a property right
in factual contents and to promote market efficiency in the database industry. The decisions in both cases indicate an intention to recognize the
economic significance of databases and resolve the problem of freeriding. However, unlike INS v. AP, the decision in the NBA v. Motorola
is based on the fact that there are different relevant markets. Under the
NBA scenario, the market would be competitive since the underlying
information remains free for all to access. On the other hand, the Court
in INS v. AP utilizes antitrust law to prevent free-riding of the gathered
facts and to secure the investment of the gatherer. Under the INS v. AP
scenario, only a handful of database compilers would remain in the market as they would obtain exclusive owner rights over the factual contents
of databases. The subsequent compilers would not have an incentive to
start collecting the same data from scratch and enter into a market already dominated by the original players. Consumers would have limited
alternatives of product selections. The market would not be freely competitive as the authority's grant would create a temporarily monopoly
status to the database industries. Lastly, both cases refer to compiled
facts that copyright law does not afford protection over unless there is
minimal creativity in the selection and arrangement of the contents. INS
v. AP refers to this type of work as a quasi property based on labor justifications corresponding to the doctrine of sweat of the brow, whereas
NBA v. Motorola mentions that compiled facts are not copyrightable
corresponding to the true copyright regime that the U.S. ratified in the
Berne Convention.
The European approach, on the other hand, seems to be more effective
than the U.S. approach. The Court's decision in Magill represents an
idea to promote the public free flow of access to information, flourishing
market competition inasmuch as the European courts consider a refusal
to license as an abuse of dominant position. It seems that the European
courts eliminate the temporary monopoly that copyright law allows
through a licensing scheme, but fail to state that the factual contents are
not copyrightable. Unlike the U.S. courts which suggest that the economic significance of the contents to the gatherers is of prime imp or97.
98.

[d.
[d. at 846.
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tance, the European courts merely suggest that a refusal to license would
impede the free movement of goods and services in the Community.
There are a number of other differences between E.U. and U.S. competition laws that need to be addressed. First, the characteristic of the U.S.
antitrust law is national, while the E.V. competition law is regional.
Second, the Magill case presents a governmental authority to examine an
existence of abuse of dominant position, but the U.S. court decisions
present infringed parties who brought the claim before the courts on a
ground of free-riding. 99 Last, the U.S. courts need not be concerned with
distinct copyright law, whereas the European courts must consider the
effect of the distinct copyright laws of the Member States and are challenged to solve problems in the national system in a way that would
promote economic and social development in the Community as a
whole. loo One similarity they share, however, is that both the U.S. courts
and the European courts efficiently utilize competition law to promote
competition in the database industries and maximize the public need of
free access to information.
IV. EXTRATERRITORIALITY ASPECT OF SUI GENERIS
PROTECTION
Within the context of competition law, the issue of extraterritoriality has
become increasingly important as the "globalization" 101 of the world

99.
Martha Neil, Old Continent, New Deal, 90 A.B.AJ. 50, 54 (2004). "A 'philosophical gulf
exists between American and European Union antitrust regulators. The U.S. Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission routinely focus on potential harm to consumers. EU regulators,
on the other hand, are concerned primarily about adverse effects the merger will have on competitors."

100.
JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 25, at 558.
Common law notion of copyright emphasizes the right of author to prevent others exploiting his work for commercial gain whereas the civil law emphasizes the right of the
creator of a work to be recognized as such and to be normally entitled to protect its integrity. U.K. copyright law, for instance, covers performers' rights and similar rights but in
most E.U. countries there is a distinction drawn between "author's right" and "neighboring rights" (those accorded to sound recordings, broadcastings, and performers). Under
the U.K. law works created by the "sweat of the brow," such as compilations of information, are accorded copyright protection, whereas civil law systems require a greater degree of creativity.
CHARLES W. HILL, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: COMPETING IN THE GLOBAL
101.
MARKETPLACE 5-14 (2nd ed. 1997).
The general understanding of the meaning of globalization is that it is a process in which
the world is moving from a system of national economies into a trade regime where barriers of different types are disappearing to create one global marketplace. It is believed
that this process of globalization is being driven by the fall of trade and investment barriers, the rapid technological advance in transportation and telecommunications, and the
increase in direct investment of companies into third markets."
See also ROHMANN, supra note 4, at 199.
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economy advances. As competition takes place on a global dimension, it
becomes more and more difficult to isolate the effects of transactions.
For an authority to be able to assert substantive jurisdiction in antitrust
matters,102 the jurisdiction must be one of two types afforded by international law. On the one hand, there is what is variously called prescriptive, legislative, or subject-matter jurisdiction, which is the right of States
to make their laws applicable to persons, territories, or situations. 103 On
the other hand, there is enforcement jurisdiction, which is the capability
to take executive action to enforce compliance with those laws. 104 Thus,
competition law primarily concerns how a state would assume its rights
to take jurisdiction in respect of conduct that has affected its own territory.105
By taking into account the whole panorama of competition law in respect
to international law, the E.U. has, by far, the most developed regime of
international protection for competition and it sets an example that
should be followed.106 On the other hand, though the United States is the
first country in which competition law set a firm legislative foothold in
the national legal system, as Judge Wood commented, the strong U.S.
antitrust law appears to put U.S. firms at a disadvantage in the competitive battle with their foreign rivals. 107 Thus, both systems share some

Although the contemporary political and policy know as globalism shares a supranational, nonisolationist outlook with other conceptions of internationalism, it differs from
most of them in its emphasis on international power and influence rather than cooperation. The term refers primarily to the U.S. policy of global engagement aimed at expanding its political influence and economic markets, but it was also applied to the Soviet Union's efforts to extend its own sphere of influence during the Cold War. "Globalism" is
also applied to the view that some problems, such as ozone depletion and global warming, cannot be effectively dealt with on a local or regional scale but must be attacked
globally.
JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 25, at 1049.
102.
On general principles, substantive jurisdiction in anti-trust matters should only be taken
on the basis of either (a) the territorial principle, or (b) the nationality principle ... The territorial principle justifies proceedings against foreigners and foreign companies only in
respect of conduct which consists in whole or in part of some activity by them in the territory of the State claiming jurisdiction ... The nationality principle justifies proceedings
against nationals of the State claiming jurisdiction in respect of their activities abroad
only provided that this does not involve interference with the legitimate affairs of other
States or cause such nationals to act in a manner which is contrary to the laws of the State
in which the activities in question are conducted.
103. Id. at 1039.
104. !d.
lOS.
Id.
106.
A. Paul Victor, et aI., Commentary: Antitrust and International Competitiveness in the
1990s, 58 ANTITRUST L.1. 591 at 4 (1989). "The competition rules of the European Economic Community, set forth in Articles 95 and 86 of the treaty of Rome and implemented by the European
Commission, are comprehensive and strong."
107. Id. at 2-3. "The message seems inescapable: the United States, or more particularly U.S.
fmns, have not been winning the competitive battle with their Pacific Rim, European, or other for-
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common characteristics in regard to the extraterritorial jurisdiction. The
U.S. and the European courts adopt the principle of the effect doctrine to
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction by conditions that (1) there are agreementes) or concerted practice(s) that create a direct and immediate restriction of competition; (2) the effect of the conduct must be reasonably
foreseeable; and (3) that the effect produced on the territory must be substantial. \08 Though they lack sufficient evidence of the court's decision
in relation to the databases subject-matter, the existing court decisions
that present an extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction should be sufficient to prove an efficiency of the effect doctrine applicable to the sui
generis databases in the global dimension.
A.

AN ASPECT OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN E.U. COMPETITION LAW

Restrictions on competition and abusive conduct which effect trade between Member States may originate outside the Community. Foreign
firms established outside the Community may, for example, fix prices in
the Community or divide the common market between them. To assume
rights to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, the ECJ must examine
whether such behavior is anti-competitive and has an effect that impedes
the free movement of goods and services in the Community. Examples
of how the ECJ applies the principle of effect doctrine to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction are demonstrated below.
In Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd (ICI) V. Commission (Dyestufft) , 109
the ECJ upheld the Commission's decision that behavior constituted a
converted practice that was prohibited by Article 81(1) of the E.C.
Treaty, holding that the Commission did have jurisdiction over the British company. 110 The Commission brought proceedings alleging that enterprises in six Member States and ICI, a company incorporated and having its headquarters in the u.K., which was not at that time a member of
the Community, had infringed Article 81(1) by means of engaging in

eign rivals ... Both existence of strong (at least on paper) antitrust law and specific aspects of those
laws have often been said to put U.S. finns at a disadvantage."
KAPLOW, supra note 20, at 145.
108.
Congress responded in 1982 with the Export Trading Company Act, which leaves little
doubt that the concern of the antitrust laws is with U.S. consumers and exporters, not foreign consumers or producers. The Act contains a new §7 making the Sherman Act inapplicable to "conduct involving ... commerce (other than import trade ... ) with foreign nations-unless such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect [on
(1) domestic or import trade or (2)]on export ... commerce ... of a person ... in the United
States.
109. Case C-48, 49, 51-57/69, Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. V. Commission, 1972 E.C.R.
619.
110. Id
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fixing prices of dyestuffs and the dye markets. III The EC] reasoned that:
first, such behavior had direct and substantial effects in the Community
markets as stated:
Although parallel behavior may not by itself be identified with a
concerted practice, it may however amount to strong evidence of
such a practice if it leads to conditions of competition which do
not correspond to the normal conditions of the market, having
regard to the nature of the products, the size and number of the
undertakings, and the volume of the said market. 112
Second, such behavior had reasonably foreseeable effects in the Community market as stated:
Although every producer is free to change his prices, taking into
account in so doing the present or foreseeable conduct of his
competitors, nevertheless it is contrary to the rules of competition contained in the Treaty for a producer to cooperate with his
competitors, in any way whatsoever, in order to determine a coordinated course of action in relation to a price increase and to
ensure its success by prior elimination of all uncertainty as to
each other's conduct regarding the essential elements of that action, such as the amount, subject-matter, date and place of the increases. 113
Further, the U.K. government adopted the approach that the EC] had no
jurisdiction and that the Commission could not exercise jurisdiction
against a foreigner who, or a foreign company which, had committed no
act within the Community. The EC] held that although the subsidiaries
within the Community had separate legal personalities, it could not outweigh the unity of their conduct on the market for the purposes of applying the rules of competition. 114 The reality was that the ICI undertaking
which had brought the concerted practice into legal question took place
within the common market. 115 The issue of lacking jurisdiction raised by
the applicants, therefore, was declared to be unfounded. 116 The subsidi-

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.

'1166.
'11118.
'11140.
'11141.
'11142.
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aries were merely carrying out the parent's order, so that they appeared
as "mere extensions ofICI in the Common Market."II?
In A Ahlstrom OsakeyhtiO v. Commission (Woodpulp) , 118 the ECJ addressed the existence of the effect doctrine in relation to the principles of
international law. The Commission investigated alleged price-fixing in
the wood pulp industry. It found that a cartel existed, and held that fortyone producers and two trade associations (Finncell and KEA) had engaged in concerted practices contrary to Article SI(I). All producers and
trade associations had their registered offices outside the Community, but
most, if not all, of the producers had branches, subsidiaries, agencies or
other establishments within the Community. The Commission adopted
the effect doctrine and extended the territorial scope of Article SI to undertakings whose registered offices were situated outside the Community
because the agreements to fix prices had affected trade between Member
States and restricted competition in the Common Market. 119
Many of the addressees appealed on two grounds that: (1) the Commission had no jurisdiction to apply its competition law to the addressees;
and (2) they had not participated in concerted practices. The EC] asserted that although the main sources of supply of wood pulp were outside the Community, in Canada, the United States, Sweden, and Finland,
the producers established in those countries sold directly to purchasers
established in the Community and engaged in practices for the purpose
of winning orders from those countries; this constituted competition
within the Common Market. 120 It followed that the producers acted in
concert on the prices to be charged to their customers in the Community
and created an effect by selling at prices which were actually coordinated, therefore taking part in a concerted effort which had the object and
effect of restricting competition within the common market within the
meaning of Article 81(1).121 Therefore, the Commission had not infringed Article 81 by applying the competition rules to the individual
undertakings.
In addition, the applicants submitted that the Commission's decision was
incompatible with public international law on the grounds that the use of
the competition rules in this case was based exclusively on the economic
repercussion within the common market. The ECJ noted that an in117.
/d.
118.
Case C-89, 104, 114, 116-117, 125-129/85, A AhlstrOm OsakeyhtiO v. Commission, 1993
E.C.R.I-\307.
119.
Id.
120. Id. ~ 12.
121. Id. ~ \3.
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fringement of Article 81 consisted of conduct made up of two elements,
the formation of the agreement, decision, and concerted practices; and
the "implementation."122 It found the producers implemented their pricing agreement within the common market. The Community's jurisdiction to apply its competition rules to such conduct was covered by the
territoriality principle as universally recognized in public international
law. 123
Further, the applicants argued on issues of the infringement of the principles of non-interference and international comity. The ECJ asserted that
there was no need to enquire into the existence of such a rule in international law since it was sufficient to observe that the conditions for its
application were, in any event, not satisfied. 124 The U.S. antitrust law did
not require export cartels to be entered into, but merely tolerated them. 125
In addition, the United States authorities had not raised any objection
regarding any conflict of jurisdiction when consulted by the Commission
pursuant to the OECD Council Recommendation of 25 October 1979
concerning Co-operation between Member Countries on Restrictive
Business Practices affecting International Trade. 126 Accordingly, the
ECJ rejected the argument relating to the disregard of international comity raised by the applicants. 127
It appears that the ECJ avoided mentioning the effect doctrine. Instead,
the ECJ used the term "implementation" which meant to cover "direct
sales" to Community purchasers and does not depend on the sellers establishing some form of marketing organization within the Community.128 The extraterritorial jurisdiction is taken simply because of sales
into the Community giving an impression that the "implementation" is
similar to the effect doctrine.

B.

AN ASPECT OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN U.S. ANTIRUST LAW

The U.S. courts confirmed that there is some extraterritorial jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America

122. /d. ~ 16.
123. /d. ~ 18.
124. Id. ~ 20.
125.
Id.
126. /d. ~21.
127. /d. ~ 23.
128. JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 25, at 1055. "Significantly, this judgment avoided talking
about 'effects'. Given the terms in which the Commission decision, the arguments before the Court,
and the Advocate General's opinion had been concluded, this avoidance of specific reference to the
effects doctrine must have been deliberated. Instead, the Court talked about 'implementation. ",
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(Alcoa),129 the Court laid down the principle of the effect doctrine to determine agreements concluded outside the U.S. This case concerned a
Canadian corporation which violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act in its
agreement with European aluminum producers to stay out of the United
States market. Judge Learned Hand stated that a "state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside
its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends"130 at least where those effects were intended. The Second Circuit held that the Sherman Act applied to a Canadian company which had
participated in a cartel intended to affect U.S. importation inasmuch as
there was direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on the
U.S. commerce. 131 However, there is no clear narration of how far the
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the Sherman Act could extend to international commerce.132 The effect test in this case was incomplete because it failed to consider the other nation's interests.
In Timberland Lumber CO. V. Bank of America, 133 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals recognized the effect doctrine by imposing additional
consideration of balancing interests in regard to the notion of "international comity."134 This case concerned an action by a U.S. company alleging that the defendants in Honduras had conspired to exclude it from
the Honduran lumber market, from where it planned to export to the U.S.
The Court laid down a tripartite analysis: first, the federal courts may
legitimately exercise subject-matter jurisdiction under those statutes;
second, a greater showing of burden or restraint may be necessary to
demonstrate that the effect was sufficiently large to present cognizable
injury to the plaintiffs and therefore a civil violation of the antitrust law;
and third, there was the additional question, which was unique to the
international setting, of whether the interest of and links to the United
States, including the magnitude of the effect on American commerce,
were sufficiently strong, vis-ii-vis those of other nations, to justify an
assertion on extraterritorial authority135 as stated:
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with
foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties
and the locations or principal places of business or corporations,
129.
United States V. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
130. Id. at 443.
131.
Id..
132.
KAPLOW, supra note 20, at 146. "The Shennan Act is presumably not intended to run the
commercial world, yet to say that only significant effects on United States foreign commerce are
covered does not identify the threshold of significance."
133.
Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F 2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 615.
134.
Id. at 613.
135.
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the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected
to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on the
United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to
which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United
States as compared with conduct abroad. 136
It appears that the Court did not deny jurisdiction but merely suggested

that it should not be exercised where the interests of the U.S. in asserting
jurisdiction were outweighed by the interests of international comity.
The Court concluded that subject matter jurisdiction was established
upon a showing of some actual or intended effect. Additional effects
might be necessary to establish the violation. Even then, the Court insisted, it may refrain from asserting "extraterritorial authority" unless the
magnitude of effects in United States commerce was sufficiently strong
in light of: (1) the several parties' nationality, allegiance, or principal
locations; (2) the relative importance of domestic and foreign conduct in
the alleged violation; (3) the relative effects on the several countries involved; (4) the clarity of foreseeability of a purpose to affect or harm
U.S. commerce; (5) foreign law or policy and degree of conflict with our
policy or law; and (6) compliance problems. I37
In comparison, both the U.S. courts and the E.U. courts share some
common characteristics. Both the U.S. and E.U. courts have demonstrated their interests to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction because there is
an economic effect to commerce within their borders. Second, the principle used in consideration was that such activity must constitute direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on their commerce. Thus,
it can be observed that both the U.S. and the E.U. courts have addressed
the notion of "international comity" by means of living peacefully with
other nations in mutual respect and accommodating their interests, the
rules of politeness, convenience, and goodwill. In reference to the applicability of the effect doctrine to the sui generis databases, although there
was no evidence of the courts' decision in this matter, both the E.U. and
the U.S. courts have satisfactorily demonstrated that the effect doctrine
could provide a sufficient mechanism for the courts to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. Other countries or regions, despite sometimes touching
upon intellectual property right questions in their competition policy
legislation, have limited experience in this area. There are a number of
136. Id. at 615.
137.
Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 749 F 2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
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bilateral and multilateral co-operative bodies that have undertaken the
creation of international competition law, such as the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). These bodies
aim at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of the member
countries' enforcement of their competition laws against such cartels as
discussed above. 138
V.

CONCLUSION

The economic mechanisms and competition law already in place prove to
be sufficient to promote competition of the database industries. However,
the WIPO Draft Database Treaty tends to constitute a monopoly in the
database industries.139 In contrast, the courts in the U.S. and the E.U.
have tended to apply competition law to promote competition in the database industries rather than to support monopoly. To assert extraterritorial jurisdiction, the courts have applied the effect doctrine to an activity
that created direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect to the
138.
JONES & SUFRIN, supra note 25, at \067-1073; see also Andres Guadamuz Gonzales,
supra note 26, at 12.
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which is made
up by the 25 most developed nations, has issued several recommendations on the issue of
competition policy. Many other international organizations have issued recommendations
on the issue of trade, globalization and competition, such as the United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices, and the United Nations Conference on Trade and
development (UNCTAD).
See also, Competition Policy and the Exercise of Intellectual Property Rights, Fourth United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and
Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices: Report of the UNCTAD Secretariat, U.N.
ESCOR, Provisional Agenda Item 6 (b), at 19, U.N. Doc. TDIRBP/CONF.5/6 (2000).
The competition policy rules applied to IPRs in developed countries or regions nowadays
are broadly similar, despite some variation in the scope of exemptions granted in this
area. These rules are based upon the premise that competition policy and the IPRs system are complementary, because IPRs promote innovation and its dissemination and
commercialization, which enhances dynamic efficiency and welfare, outweighing any
static allocative efficiency losses adversely affecting prices and quantities of products ...
There is therefore a need for effects to promote mutual understanding and confidencebuilding in this area. In this respect, it has been suggested that the deliberations of the
WTO Working Group on this subject provide and analytical basis for further work on
fostering common approaches to competition enforcement policies in this area among
WTO member countries and that, taking into account these deliberations as well as related economic literature and national enforcement policies, future work in this area
might cover the following issues: comparative approaches to the treatment of licensing
arrangements; the role of IP in networks industries; the emergence of new strategies for
the exercise of market power through the acquisition of IPRs and the use of patent infringement suits to deter the entry of competitors; the concept of "innovation markets"
and the implications of the territorial divisibility of IPRs and the case for applying the
doctrine of exhausting ofiPRs in international trade.
139. Basic Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in
Respect of Databases to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, WIPO Doc. CRNRIDC/6
(Aug. 3, 1996) [hereinafter WIPO Draft Database Treaty].
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free movement of goods and services in the territories and addressed the
importance of the consideration of international comity and other principles of international law. Further, it appears that the governmental bodies
of the U.S. and the E.U. understand the economic mechanisms of Demand-Supply and Maximizing Behavior and utilize competition law to
support them. The public benefits are maximized inasmuch as there is a
free flow of access to factual contents and information and competition
flourishes.
An important question remains regarding the implementation of systems.

Could economic mechanisms and systems similar to those in developed
countries work in developing and least developed countries? In order to
sustain national economic and social infrastructure, in particular human
resource development, developing and least developed countries need a
free flow of access to information. De Soto explains that the increasingly
integrated global economic system has produced important efficiency
gains, but the new system's market dynamic is still not fully understood.
Citizens in developing and least developed countries cannot understand
how to convert their property into capital, and lawyers and legislatures
are busy studying the legal-economic system in developed countries instead of trying to more deeply understand their fundamental national
interests. 140 His statement reveals that no matter how far the global economic system has been integrated and the foreign advanced technology
has been transferred and available to them, the citizens in developing and
least developed countries could hardly ever apply the same logic of legal
and economic standards, such as how to convert their intellectual assets
into a balance sheet. 141 Amidst the privatization boom, and the need to
maximize profit - which is having a growing impact on the concept of
new mechanisms for controlling the use and dissemination of undeveloped compilations and collections of information in the Third World
countries - the wealth of knowledge has moved freely from generation to
generation. In addition, Goldstein comments that, in regard to an enforcement of intellectual property rights, taking U.S. standards as the
basis for analysis tends to highlight a large number of enforcement inadequacies that exist in developing countries. 142 Problems often men-

140.
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 153-206 (2000).
141.

[d.

142.
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW; CASES AND
MATERIALS 67 (200 I). Developing countries have significantly changed attitudes toward foreign
investments and technology transfer in the 1980s. The foreign debt crisis, decreasing private capital
flows to developing countries, negative experiences with the regulatory approach, outward-oriented
development strategies, and the ongoing "technological revolution" are some of the possible explanations for the more liberal posture adopted by many developing countries on intellectual property.
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tioned include: the slowness of the enforcement process; discrimination
against foreigners; biased court decisions; inadequate civil and criminal
remedies; and corruption. 143 The enforcement component of a "mature"
intellectual property rights system is not always easily emulated in developing countries. If databases were recognized as "a vital element in
the development of a global information infrastructure and an essential
tool for promoting economic, cultural and technological advancement,"I44 the concept of the public free flow of access to information
should be realized for the purpose of human resource development and
the vital global economy.

Yet for a developing country the economic implications of the trade-off between static and dynamic
aspects of the production and allocation of knowledge remain open to debate.
143. Id.
144. WIPO Draft Database Treaty, supra note 139, at Preamble Clause.
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